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Commercial banking has been subject to antitrust review for 
only a few decades. In 1948, the Transamerica Corporation was 
charged by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system 
with a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act when it 
acquired controlling interest in several independent banks in 
California.Cl) At the time of the acquisitions, the banks in 
question were in direct competition with one or more of the 
banks already controlled by Transamerica Corporation. Moreover, 
Transamerica corporation held a major interest in Bank of 
America. This unique case ignited a fear of probable banking 
concentration and potential banking monopoly. 
The debate about concentrations in banking led to a 
congressional inquiry and a subsequent staff report entitled 
"Bank Mergers and Concentration of Banking Facilities." The 
report stated that the reduction in the number of banks 
nationwide had lessened competition in many banking communities 
and recommended remedial legislation to ensure that government 
banking authorities would study the effect of such merger and 
acquisitions prior to approving any sort of bank merger of 
consolidation.(2) 
Although the Congressional report did not lead to any 
direct legislation at that time, it did provide the framework 
(1) David A. Alhadeff, Monopoly and Competition in Banking, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954, p. 2. 
(2) Ibid 
for the Bank Merger Act of 1960. This Act provided for direct 
administrative control of bank mergers and established a 
procedure for a review of proposed bank merger transactions by 
the appropriate federal regulatory agency. In a subsequent 
action, the Bank Merger Act of 1966 clarified the roles of the 
federal regulatory agencies in potential bank mergers. This Act 
also set forth the minimum time frame, following approval of a 
merger transaction, before consummation of the merger may take 
place. This period of time was established in order to allow 
the Department of Justice an opportunity to contest merger 
transactions. Prior to passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 
banking was generally held to be separate from "commerce" and 
therefore not subject to antitrust laws. 
The Supreme Court's 1963 decision involving the 
Philadelphia National Bank, however, removed any doubts as to 
the applicability of antitrust to banking. The Court applied 
the narrow competitive criterion of Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
(1914) rather than the broader criteria of the Bank Merger Act. 
The Supreme Court found commercial banks to off er a unique 
"cluster" of products that comprise a separate line of commerce. 
This important antitrust law prohibits mergers when "in any line 
of commerce in any section of the country the effect of such 
acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition". (3) In 
affirming Section 7 of the Clayton Act to bank mergers, the 
Supreme Court stated 11 ••• that the cluster of products (various 
(3) The Clayton Act, 15 u.s.c. 18 (1914). 
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kinds of credit) and services (such as checking account and 
trust administration) denoted by the term "commercial 
banking, 11 ••• composes a distinct line of commerce ... 11 (4) The 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance in the Philadelphia National 
case in 1970 with its case involving Phillipsburg National 
Bank. 
Since the 1960s, the task of reviewing the antitrust 
effects of proposed commercial bank mergers and bank holding 
company acquisitions has rested primarily with the three federal 
banking agencies. The Federal Reserve System has jurisdiction 
over state member banks and all acquisitions involving bank 
holding companies; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) over state nonmember banks; and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the currency (OCC) over national banks. The 
Department of Justice also plays a roll in banking antitrust in 
that it may, within 30 days of agency approval, bring suit to 
prevent any merger. 
Prior to the 1980s, it was common for the banking agencies 
to reject proposed bank mergers and bank holding company 
acquisitions for antitrust reasons. Since 1980, legislative 
changes, judicial rulings, and agency decisions have combined to 
create a regulatory climate that has produced far fewer 
rejections of both horizontal and market extension mergers. 
(4) "Mergers, Thrift Power Pose Issue of Public Policy on 
competition," The American Banker, August 24, 1977, 
p. 9. 
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on the legislative side, the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-st. 
Germain Act of 1982 substantially increased the "banking" powers 
of thrift institutions and further weakened the concept of 
commercial banking as a separate line of commerce. In addition, 
the Department of Justice in 1982 revised its merger guidelines 
that had been in usage since 1968.(5) 
On the judicial side, the u.s. Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1981 had two important decisions.(6) First, the 
Court overturned the Federal Reserve's rejection of a market 
extension acquisition, and secondly, the Court ruled that no 
banking acquisition or merger could be denied for competitive 
reasons unless the merger or acquisition constituted an 
antitrust violation. This second position essentially 
prohibited the federal banking agencies from having antitrust 
standards more strict than those of the Department of Justice. 
Subsequent to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decisions, the federal banking agencies published their 
guidelines for evaluating potential market extension mergers. 
In 1982, the Federal Reserve Board publicly listed four specific 
(5) Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert, "The 1982 Department of 
Justice Merger Guidelines: Applications to Banking 
Mergers." Issues in Bank Regulation, Winter, 1983, 
p. 18. 
(6) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systme, 
"Antitrust Laws, Justice Department Guidelines, and the 
Limits of Concentration in Local Banking Markets," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, June, 1984, p. 2. 
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criteria that would have to be met before a market extension 
merger could be rejected on antitrust grounds: (1) the market 
of the firm to be acquired is highly concentrated (i.e., it is 
operating noncompetitively), (2) there are relatively few 
probable future entrants into the market, (3) the acquiring firm 
is a likely entrant into the target market, and (4) alternative 
entry by the acquiring firm would significantly encourage 
competition in the market structure.(7) 
The combined effect of the aforementioned legislative 
changes and judicial changes, coupled with the changes in the 
Justice Department's merger guidelines and public pronouncement 
of the banking agencies standards, has not resulted in a denial 
of a market extension merger since 1980.(8) The catalyst in the 
approval rate was twofold. First, the Department of Justice 
published its methodology for defining product and geographic 
markets. And secondly, the Department of Justice elected to use 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") rather than the four-firm 
concentration ratio as a measure of market concentration.(9) 
Another substantive factor that has greatly facilitated bank 
(7) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 12 
c.F.R. Chapter 11, "Statement of Policy on Bank 
Acquisitions," February 26, 1982, pp. 1-3. 
(8) Anthony w. Cyrnak, "Banking Antitrust in Transition," 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco FRBSF Weekly 
Letter, December 26, 1986, p. 2. 
(9) Stephen A. Rhoades, "Merger Guidelines: Their Purpose, 
construction, and Implementation," Bankers Magazine, 
January-February, 1983, p. 29. 
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mergers has been the use of branch and bank divestitures to 
eliminate or reduce the negative effects of certain horizontal 
mergers. 
The "HHI" was developed in the mid-1940s by Orris c. 
Herfindahl and Albert o. Hirschman; however, it was not widely 
used as a measure of concentration in antitrust studies until 
the 1960s. In 1964, George Stigler popularized the index in his 
article entitled "A Theory of Oligopoly 11 .(lO) In the 1970s, as 
merger and acquisition transactions increased, more emphasis was 
placed on competition and the "HHI" gained rapid acceptance. 
And finally in 1982, the Justice Department's acceptance of the 
index fueled near total usage in determining market 
concentrations of potential mergers and acquisitions. 
Prior to 1982, the concept of commercial banking being a 
separate line of commerce was quite pure and narrow. In the 
purest sense, "commercial banking" implied financial banking 
institutions. These entities did not include savings and loans, 
credit unions, investment banks, or trust companies. However, 
in 1975 as commercial banks sought to shed their restrictive 
branch banking statutes, as well as restrictions on what 
financial services they could offer and interest rates they 
could pay on deposits, they realized that many inroads had been 
cut into "their" traditional markets.(11) Savings and loan 
(10) Donald I. Baker and William Blumenthal, "Demystifying 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index," Mergers and 
Acquisitions, Summer, 1982, p. 43. 
(11) "Benefits of Competition Cited as Main Argument in 
Favor of Branch Banking," The American Banker, 
Editorial, September 27, 1978, p. 7. 
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associations for example, which were not bound by antibranching 
statutes, were beginning to offer transaction services that so 
closely resembled those offered by commercial banks that 
consumers could find little meaningful distinction between the 
two financial institutions. 
In 1977, several articles were written by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston which denoted the increasing powers of 
thrift institutions, particularly in New England. New England 
thrifts were offering negotiable orders of withdrawal accounts 
(NOW accounts). Moreover, state-chartered thrift institutions 
were offering checking accounts, credit cards, and making 
personal loans in various New England states.(12) This inroad 
by the thrifts started to "muddy the waters" to the continuing 
validity of the Supreme Court ruling that commercial banking 
constitutes a separate line of commerce. 
The debate as to whether thrifts should be considered 
direct competitors of commercial banks continued until the 
1980s. Then in 1980 and 1982, with the passage of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
and the Garn-st. Germain Act, respectively, the treatment of 
thrifts as direct competitors started to grow.(13) These Acts 
gave thrift institutions, nationwide, the ability to make 
(12) "Mergers, ·rhrift Power Pose Issue of Public Policy on 
competition," The American Banker, August 24, 1977, 
p. 9. 
(13) Donald L. Welker, "Thrift Competition: Does It 
Matter?," Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic 
Review, January-February, 1986, p. 3. 
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commercial and industrial loans and to off er transaction 
accounts (such as NOW accounts). These two activities 
previously had distinguished the banking industry from the 
thrift industry. 
More recent studies have suggested that although thrifts 
have garnered these additional powers, they have not fully 
exploited their potential marketability. Thrifts are being 
viewed upon as direct and viable competitors of commercial 
banks, despite the fact they have not fully capitalized on these 
opportunities. The primary regulators (Federal Reserve, FDIC, 
and OCC) subsequent to 1982 issued merger standards that 
considered the competitiveness of thrifts. These regulators 
gave various weights to the roles thrifts played in market 
shares. The Federal Reserve Bank, for example, currently 
considers only 50 percent of a thrifts' deposit base for market 
competition; whereas, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) gives weight to 100 percent of a thrifts' deposit 
base. The Department of Justice, on the other hand, gives 
consideration to only 20 percent of a thrift's commercial 
deposits and 100 percent to its consumer deposits. Although the 
weights assigned by the various banking regulatory agencies 
differ, in the final analysis, their antitrust standards cannot 
be more restrictive than those of the Department of Justice. 
In 1985, the Department of Justice indicated that it is not 
likely to challenge bank mergers and acquisitions unless the 
Herf indahl-Hirschman Index after the transaction is 1800 points 
or higher and the combination of the companies raises the Index 
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by at least 200 points.(14) A few recent bank mergers may even 
suggest that the Department of Justice will give greater weight 
to.thrift institutions if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is 
beyond these established benchmarks and the overall market 
concentration impact is considered minimal. 
Objectives of the Study 
This study seeks to underscore the unique and often 
difficult task of defining, delineating, and analyzing bank 
competition and relevant banking markets as they relate to the 
merger and acquisition activity of financial institutions. 
Federal regulatory agency personnel (i.e. the banking agencies 
and the Department of Justice}, bankers, lawyers, and judges 
have grappled with this task since banking was first denoted as 
a separate line of commerce. This study emphasizes the fact 
that thrift institutions provide far greater competition for 
commercial banks than currently recognized, and thus challenges 
the concept that commercial banking is a "separate line of 
commerce". This will be shown through an examination of the 
impact of thrifts in analyzing competition of the commercial 
banking industry. 
Banking organizations often employ full time staffs and/or 
outside consulting firms to prepare and analyze market data in 
an attempt to gain regulatory approval for a proposed merger 
(14) Frederick T. Furlong, "Assessing Bank Antritrust 
standards," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
FRBSF Weekly Letter, May 15, 1987, p. 1. 
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transaction. Since the publication of the Department of Justice 
Guidelines in 1982, the evaluation of competition (or lack 
thereof) between commercial banking institutions has been fairly 
standard to quantify. However, with the rapid degree of 
consolidation in the thrift industry, the expansion of the 
commercial banking market, and the growth of the non-bank 
financial services industry, the competition created by thrift 
institutions for "commercial banking" relationships has clouded 
the once "simple" calculation. It is from this perspective that 
this study was written so that interested parties may gain 
insight into the meaning of competition and the importance of 
proper market delineation and identification. 
Scope and Method of Presentation 
While the majority of bank merger cases acted upon by 
federal regulatory agencies are approved and the mergers 
ultimately consummated, a small number of such cases are found 
to be anticompetitive and violate the intent of the Bank Merger 
Act or Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The probability of gaining 
approval for a proposed merger was increased by the development 
and release of the Department of Justice guidelines on mergers 
and acquisitions. Since public attention has focused upon the 
traditional connotation of banking as a "separate line of 
commerce", several cases will be reviewed to display the 
potential impact of thrift institutions in evaluating potential 
mergers and acquisitions. 
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This study is technical in nature and requires a basic 
understanding of commercial banking and the financial industry. 
In addition, an understanding of basic industry terms, as they 
relate to bank merger analysis, is required. Attention is 
directed to the Glossary of Bank Merger Terms included as an 
appendix to this study. 
It is not the intent of this paper to review or analyze in 
depth other considerations in a proposed bank merger transaction 
such as accounting treatment, profit motive, financial and 
managerial resources of the institutions involved, the resultant 
bank's future prospects, or other statutory banking factors. 
Considerations relating to the convenience and needs of the 
community to be served will be covered only to the extent that 
its inclusion is involved in the consideration of the relevant 
banking market and competition in general. 
This study will be limited to the view of the subject 
matter within the federal regulatory framework and will not take 
into account the legislation imposed by the various state 
banking agencies. 
Defining A Market Area 
Defining an institution's market area has recently become 
more important. In the arena of mergers and acquisitions, both 
the regulatory agencies and the Department of Justice seek ways 
to "clearly" identify and prevent potentially unfair 
competition. The controversy caused by mergers usually centers 
on a concern that the combination of two or more competing 
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entities will result in higher prices and reduced services in a 
given market. Therefore, laws focus upon the impact of prices 
and output as the result of a banking merger. 
"To enforce these laws with respect to existing 
competition, the regulatory agencies and the courts had to make 
two fundamental decisions. First, they had to determine whether 
banks seeking to combine actually compete. Second, they had to 
determine whether allowing the proposed merger or acquisition 
would significantly lessen competition in the market or markets 
where they compete.11(15) 
The determination as to whether two or more institutions 
actually compete has been as much of an art as a science. The 
principal barometer of potential competition has been the 
institution's deposit base. Although the deposit base is 
subject to manipulation,(16) it is a benchmark that is used by 
financial institutions in determining the required level of 
deposit insurance and the required level of reserves held with 
the Federal Reserve Bank. Moreover, the deposits are reported 
quarterly to the various regulatory agencies via "Call Reports". 
The validity of the deposit levels are usually tested and 
verified by representatives of the primary regulatory agencies. 
(15) David D. Whitehead, "Relevant Geographic Banking 
Markets: How Should They Be Defined," Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review, January-February, 
1980, p. 20. 
(16) Deposit manipulation, for example, may be caused by 
the purchase and sale of brokered deposits or by the 
purchase of "hot money" through the offering of above 
market rates in specific geographic areas. 
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The basis of which deposits to use and over what geographic 
banking area has evolved through several interpretations. Until 
1967, "the primary service area of a bank was defined as the 
area in which at least 75% of the IPC (individual, partnership, 
and corporation) deposits were located". (17) This definition 
failed to discount the large concentration of commercial 
deposits brought in to an area and also failed to recognize the 
true service area. Subsequently two years later, the definition 
of "the primary service area" was redefined as the area in which 
90% of the demand deposit accounts were located and 75% of the 
dollar volume of demand deposits were located. This definition 
emphasized demand deposits rather than IPC deposits, since it 
was felt that demand deposits more accurately represent the 
geographic area the bank may serve. This ideology originated 
from the concept that demand deposits represent the working cash 
balances of "local" depositors. Then in 1980, the regulatory 
agencies defined the primary service area as "the area in which 
each individual bank or banking office successfully markets its 
services. This area was specifically defined as the smallest 
area contiguous to the bank's office from which it gets 80% of 
its accounts". (18) 
Once the primary service area (or relevant geographic 
banking area) is defined, it is relevant for all banks located 
(17) David o. Whitehead, "Relevant Geographic Banking 
Markets: How Should They Be Defined," Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review, January-February, 
1980, p. 20. 
(18) Ibid 
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within these boundaries. However, this definition may not hold 
for all times. Economic growth or decline may alter banking 
markets. Changes in population density, commuting patterns, and 
new bank entries on the perimeter of the market may change a 
bank's primary service area and must be taken into account. In 
addition, "state/federal road building activities and other 
projects designed to remove physical obstacles to transportation 
and commerce also contribute to the expansion of banking markets 
in some communities". (19) The Department of Justice and the 
regulatory agencies in an apparent attempt to standardize the 
relevant geographic banking area in metropolitan areas are using 
RMAs (Ranally Metro Area) to define the primary service area. 
An RMA is defined by Rand McNally as 11 (1) a central city or 
cities; (2) any adjacent continuously built-up areas; and (3) 
other communities •.• if at least 8% of the population or 20% of 
its labor force commutes to the central city and its adjacent 
built-up areas 11 (20) and the population density is at least 70 
per square mile unless undergoing rapid development. Most areas 
with a total population of 40,000 or more are included. 
Another factor that is taken into consideration are the 
products that are offered by the competing institutions within 
the 'geographic market. Theoretically, a market consists of all 
(19) Donald L. Welker, "Thrift Competition: Does It 
Matter?," Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic 
Review, January-February, 1986, p. 2. 
(20) Rand McNally & Company. Commercial Atlas and 
Marketing Guide. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 
1985. 
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the potential customers sharing a particular need or want who 
might be willing and able to engage in exchange to satisfy that 
need or want. Additionally, a market may be defined as 
including "those firms producing sufficiently substitutable 
products or services in such proximity to one another that a 
change in prices by one of the firms will influence the prices 
or output of other firmsn.(21) 
As applied to banking, it is evident that many basic 
banking services can be efficiently provided in local geographic 
markets. These services, which can be provided by both banks 
and savings and loans, include both deposit and lending powers. 
Until 1980, and the subsequent passage of the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), 
federally chartered savings and loans had limited ability to 
compete for consumer savings. With the passage of DIDMCA, both 
banks and thrifts had the ability to offer consumer interest-
bearing transactions accounts as well as a full range of savings 
and time instruments. "Although state chartered thrifts have 
offered consumer loans for several years, federally chartered 
thrifts were first allowed to offer consumer loans in 1980. The 
Garn-st. Germain Act expanded this power by permitting thrifts 
to invest up to 30% of their assets in consumer loans. This act 
also permitted federally chartered thrifts to offer overdraft 
(21) Jim Burke, Stephen A. Rhoades, and John Wolken, 
"Thrift Institutions and Their New Powers," The 
Journal of Commercial Bank Lending, June, 1987, 
p. 44. 
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loans, including overdrafts on transaction accounts". (22) 
The Garn-St. Germain Act also allowed these federally 
chartered thrifts to offer both commercial deposit and 
commercial lending services. The commercial demand deposits, 
however, are limited to businesses with which the thrifts have a 
loan relationship. The commercial lending authority allowed 
thrifts to make commercial loans up to 10% of their assets. 
Moreover, thrifts are allowed to engage up to 10% of their 
assets in leasing. 
The Impact of Thrifts 
As a result of the expanded powers granted to thrift 
institutions, commercial lending and transaction deposit 
accounts are no longer the exclusive domain of commercial banks. 
Consequently, the appropriate definition of the relevant market 
and who a bank's competitors may be are subject to question. As 
the thrift industry continues to consolidate, they represent a 
greater threat to the market base of commercial banks. In 
addition, the growth of the commercial paper market has reduced 
the demand for commercial loans, therefore, the market of 
quality commercial loans has decreased. Although the commercial 
portfolio of thrift's is limited to 10% of their total assets, 
several studies have shown that approximately 50% of the 
commercial banks have commercial portfolios that are equal to or 
(22) Ibid 
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less than that 10% ceiling. From another perspective, thrifts 
have had the "upper hand" on commercial banks for some time. In 
addition to the commercial "banking" powers received since 1980, 
thrifts have historically been able to engage in both consumer 
and commercial real estate activities. Commercial banks have 
only recently been able to engage in these activities, and even 
then to a limited degree. 
In summary, the current definition of banking as a separate 
line of commerce is inadequate and should be expanded to 
incorporate the growing thrift industry. Powers gained from 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA) and Garn-st. Germain Act have leveled the playing 
field. Although thrifts have not fully utilized their "new" 
powers, neither have the majority of commercial banks. In 
addition, the consolidation of the thrift industry is creating 
many thrifts that are able to compete with commercial banks 
"head-to-head". In 1985, for instance, thrifts represented 33 
of 49 depository institutions in California with domestic 
deposits greater than $1 billion(23) and controlled 
approximately 49% of the total state deposits. The recognition 
of thrifts as competitors of commercial banks is important as it 
can measurably decrease the concentration in a banking market. 
The presence of thrifts in a given market makes it easier to 
(23) Frederick T. Furlong, "The Wells Fargo-Crocker 
Acquisition," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
FRBSF weekly Letter, November 28, 1986. 
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meet the Department of Justice guidelines and consequently to 
secure approval for mergers and acquisitions involving financial 
institutions. 
Measuring Competition in the Market 
"Although the relevant geographic banking area and the 
relevant product market define the market area of the bank, 
neither identify the level of competition within the 
~~~ket 11 .(24) Prior to 1982, the Department of Justice measured 
the degree of competition in a market by the four-firm deposit 
concentration ratio. The four-firm deposit concentration ratio 
calculates the combined share of the four largest firms in a 
market and expresses this concentration measure as a percentage 
of the market. "As an example, if the four largest banks in a 
market control 80% of deposits in the area, the four-firm 
concentration ratio will be 80%. It is evident that these four 
banks control a dominant share of the market, however, the ratio 
does not tell how many institutions may hold the remaining 
market share of 20% 11 • (25) 
since 1982, and the release of the Department of Justice 
Merger Guidelines, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) has been 
the standard device for measuring market concentration. The use 
(24) Donald L. Welker, "Thrift Competition: Does It 
Matter?," Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic 
Review, January-February, 1986, p. 3. 
(25) Ibid 
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of the HHI was reaffirmed in the Department of Justice's 
"Revised Merger Guidelines" issued in June 1984. In addition to 
the Department of Justice, the HHI has been adopted by other 
regulatory agencies including the Federal Reserve Bank and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 
The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the 
individual market shares of all the banks included in the 
market. For example, a market consisting of five banks may have 
this allocation of market shares: 
Bank #1 
Bank #2 
Bank #3 
28% 
26% 
21% 
Bank #4 
Bank #5 
13% 
7% 
The HHI for the market is 2119, or 2119 = (28 x 28) + (26 x 26) 
+ (21 x 21) + (13 x 13) + (7 x 7). The increase in the HHI 
resulting from a merger is calculated by doubling the product of 
the market shares of the merging banks. Thus, if Bank #1 and 
Bank #5 were merged, the HHI would increase by 392, or 392 = 2 x 
28 x 7. The new HHI is 2511, or 2511 = (35 x 35) + (26 x 26) + 
(21 x 21) + (13 x 13). The HHI ranges from 10,000 (100 x 100) 
in a pure monopolistic market to near zero in a highly 
competitive market. 
The 1982 Department of Justice guidelines divide markets 
into three categories. Those markets with a post-merger HHI 
below 1000 are considered unconcentrated; markets with a post-
merger HHI between 1000 and 1800 are considered moderately 
concentrated; and markets with a post-merger HHI over 1800 are 
considered highly concentrated. Generally the Department of 
19 
Justice challenges mergers in which the HHI rises by 100 points 
or more. However, for financial institutions, it has indicated 
it will not challenge a bank merger unless two conditions are 
met. "First, the post-merger HHI must be greater than 1800 and 
secondly, the rise in the HHI attributed to the merger must 
exceed 200 points 11 .(26) The additional 100 points allowed for 
bank mergers by the Department of Justice is due to the many 
other near-bank competitors in the financial industry market 
which cannot be evaluated adequately from readily available 
data. 
"The Department of Justice's Revised Merger Guidelines 
encompass numerous criteria for evaluating horizontal mergers, 
but as a starting point they have established the following 
general standards based upon the HHI: 
a) Post - Merger IIllI Below 1000. Markets in this region 
generally would be considered to be unconcentrated. Because 
implicit coordination among firms is likely to be difficult and 
because the prohibitions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act are 
usually an adequate response to any explicit collusion that 
might occur, the Department will not challenge mergers falling 
in this region, except in extraordinary circumstances. 
b) Post - Merger IIllI Between 1000 and 1800. Because this 
region extends from the point at which the competitive concerns 
associated with concentrations are raised to the point at which 
they become quite serious, generalization is particularly 
difficult. The Department, however, is unlikely to challenge a 
merger producing an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points. 
The Department is likely to challenge mergers in this region 
that produce an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points, 
unless the Department concludes, on the basis of the post -
(26) Interview with A. Linwood Gill, III, Bank Supervision 
and Regulation Department, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. 
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merger HHI, the presence or absence of (nonstatistical factors 
discussed elsewhere in the guidelines) that the merger is not 
likely substantially to less competition. 
c) Post - Merger lllII Above 1800. Markets in this region 
generally are considered to be highly concentrated. Additional 
concentration resulting from mergers is a matter of significant 
competitive concern. The Department is unlikely, however, to 
challenge mergers producing an increase in the HHI of less than 
50 points. The Department is likely to challenge mergers in 
this region that produce an increase in the HHI of more than 50 
points, unless the Department concludes on the basis of the post 
- merger HHI, the increase in the HHI, and the presence or 
absence of (nonstatistical factors discussed elsewhere in the 
guidelines) that the merger is not likely substantially to 
lessen competition. However, if the increase in the HHI exceeds 
100 and the post - merger HHI substantially exceeds 1800, only 
in extraordinary cases will such factors establish that the 
merger is not likely substantially to lessen competition. 11 (27) 
The utilization of the HHI has partially identified and 
leveled the playing field·for financial institutions considering 
mergers and acquisitions; however, the various regulatory 
agencies are divergent in their respective application of Thrift 
deposits in computing the HHI. For instance, the Federal 
Reserve Bank generally includes 50% of the total deposits held 
by thrifts as a component of the relevant banking market. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) considers both 
federally insured banks and thrifts represented by off ices in a 
market, as well as uninsured depository institutions, and even 
nonbank financial companies. The Department of Justice divides 
the "banking market" into two segments, retail and wholesale. 
In the retail (or consumer) market, the Department gives weight 
to 100% of the thrift deposits. In the wholesale (or 
(27) Donald I. Baker and William Blumenthal, "Demystifying 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index," Mergers and 
Acquisitions, summer, 1984, p. 46. 
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commercial) market, only 20% of the thrift deposits are 
considered due to the "limited" ability of thrifts to engage in 
commercial lending. And the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency treats thrifts institutions as full competitors of 
commercial banks. 
As a practical matter, it makes little difference whether 
one uses the HHI or the four-firm deposit concentration ratio in 
analyzing the competition in a market. In a 1985 article by 
Claudio Michelini and Michael Pickford, the authors found a very 
high correlation between the two measures. The real question in 
many potential mergers and acquisitions is not how one should 
measure concentration in a market, but what is the relevant 
geographic banking market. 
Prior studies on the impact of thrift competition on bank 
merger and acquisitions have not addressed specific cases. In 
January 1986, Welker discussed the magnitude of thrift deposits 
in the top ten banking markets in the Fifth Federal Reserve 
District.{28) A subsequent study in January 1988, by Baker and 
severiens, addresses the impact of thrift institutions in the 
less urban areas of the State of Ohio.{2 9) Although each of 
these studies concluded that thrifts do make a difference, 
neither addressed a specific merger situation. 
{28) Donald L. Welker, "Thrift competition: Does It 
Matter?," Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic 
Review, January-February, 1986, pp. 2-7. 
(29) James c. Baker and Jacobus T. Severiens, 
"Concentration in Bank Markets: Do Thrifts Make a 
Difference?," American Business Review, January, 1988, 
PP· 1-7. 
22 
To identify the specific impact that thrift instutitions 
have on market competition analysis, a case-by-case approach is 
needed as a result of unique factors found in each financial 
community. This next section entitled "Merger Scenarios" will 
focus on the potential impact thrift institutions have on the 
mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions in the 
Richmond, Virginia RMA. These merger scenarios reflect one 
actual merger and one hypothetical merger. The mergers will be 
analyzed using commonly accepted methods of analyzing market 
concentration, such as the four-firm deposit concentration ratio 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Each of the merger 
situations addresses specific market conditions in the Richmond 
RMA. Additionally, each case will evaluate the impact of thrift 
deposits utilizing the Federal Reserve Bank and Office of the 
Comptroller of the currency merger guidelines. 
The initial case of Virginia National Bank and First & 
Merchants National Bank involves the merger of two banks 
headquartered in different market areas of the State of 
Virginia. These institutions facilitated their highly 
publicized 1982 merger through the divestiture of branches in 
overlapping markets. This case reassesses the impact thrift 
institutions in the Richmond RMA would have had on the 1982 
merger analysis had current merger standards been applicable. 
The second case, which is purely hypothetical, reflects the 
merger of Bank of Virginia and Central Fidelity Bank, N.A. Both 
of these institutions are headquartered in Richmond, Virginia. 
This case was evaluated applying current merger standards and 
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attempts to assess the market concentration using 50% and 100% 
of the Richmond RMA thrift deposits, respectively. The 
significance of this potential merger is highlighted by the fact 
that Bank of Virginia and Central Fidelity Bank, N.A. currently 
hold the third and fourth largest market shares of the Richmond 
RMA. 
Merger Scenarios 
Case #1 
Sovran Bank, N.A. was created through the merger 
transaction of First & Merchants National Bank, Richmond, 
Virginia and Virginia National Bank, Norfolk, Virginia. At the 
time of the merger, the two institutions had total deposits of 
$2.2 billion and $3.1 billion, respectively. Prior to the 
merger, the two entities had branch offices in a total of 
thirty-eight (38) markets throughout the State of Virginia. The 
proposed merger resulted in the elimination of existing 
competition in ten (10) of these local markets. Because some of 
the combined market shares were so high, the merging parties 
agreed to divest some of their offices in six of the markets in 
order to facilitate the proposed merger through the Office of 
the Comptroller of the currency (CCC). 
In the Richmond, Virginia RMA, the proposed merger would 
require the divestiture of two branches. Although the 
combination of these two entities (the first and third largest 
in the state) would appear to require a higher level of 
divestiture, Virginia National Bank (VNB) had only a minor 
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market presence in the Richmond RMA. VNB had a total of eight 
offices with aggregate deposits of $87,262,000, which 
represented 2.4% of the banking offices and 1.9% of the total 
deposits in the Richmond RMA. Comparatively, First & Merchants 
National Bank (F&M) controlled 7.7% of the banking offices and 
15.4% of the total deposits. Of the combined offices 
represented by the two banking organizations, the two branches 
that were divested accounted for only 2.1% or $15,717,000 of the 
total deposits controlled by the institutions. 
Based on deposit data as of June 30, 1980, the combined 
institution controlled approximately 24.2% of the total banking 
deposits. However, when thrift institutions were taken into 
consideration, the deposits represented only 17.3% of the total 
deposits (see Appendix B). The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which 
totaled 585.64 for the combined institutions using current 
concentration guidelines, declined to 299.29 when 100% of thrift 
deposits were used in the market concentration calculation. 
Furthermore, when the Federal Reserve Bank standard of 50% was 
applied to the HHI calculation, the post-merger HHI increased 
only 82.55 basis points to 1,665.97. 
Pre-nerger 
Post-nerger 
Net Increase 
HHI EXCIDDING 
THRIFT DEIOSI'IS 
1,882.73 
2,000.60 
117.87 
HHI INCIIJDING 
100% OF 
'IHRIFT DEIOSI'IS 
1,087.05 
1,145.57 
58~52 
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HHI INCIDDING 
50% OF 
THRIFT DEIOSI'IS 
1,583.42 
1,665.97 
82.55 
The decline in the Herf indahl-Hirschman Index reflects the 
significant market presence of the thrift institutions. As of 
June 30, 1980, thrift institutions in the Richmond RMA had 78 
offices and total deposits of approximately $1.258 billion. 
These deposits represented 27.8% of the total deposits held by 
all financial institutions in the Richmond RMA. Moreover, 72 of 
these offices were in localities in which F&M held a significant 
market share. The six remaining offices were in Hanover county 
where VNB did not have a market presence and F&M had only one 
office with total deposits of $24,070,000, or 12.1% of the 
~ 
Hanover County market. 
One of the branch off ices divested was a VNB off ice in 
Chesterfield County. Although this office was situated across 
the street from a F&M office, it was also in close proximity to 
a majority of the thrift offices located in Chesterfield County. 
In Chesterfield county, as of June 30, 1980, thrifts held 36% of 
the total deposits. If thrifts had been taken into account as a 
competitor, it is doubtful that the divestiture would had been 
required on competitive grounds. More likely, the two 
institutions would have probably closed one of the offices due 
to the inefficiency of operating two off ices so close 
geographically. 
In summary, the addition of thrift deposits into the 
VNB/F&M market concentration calculation strongly suggests that 
the potential merger could have been consummated without the 
divestiture of branches in the Richmond RMA.. This case also 
suggests that based upon Department of Justice merger 
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guidelines, it is unlikely that the merger would have been 
contested. 
case #2 
The following case is based on the assumed merger of Bank 
of Virginia(30) and Central Fidelity Bank, N.A. in the Richmond 
RMA. Although the proposed merger in reality is not likely, if 
consummated, the potential impact of considering thrift 
institutions in determining market concentration is quite 
significant. 
As of June 30, 1986, Bank of Virginia (BOVA) controlled 
approximately $1.4 billion, or 22.4% of the total deposits held 
by commercial banks in the Richmond RMA. These deposits were 
gathered through 30 banking offices, predominantly concentrated 
in Chesterfield and Henrico Counties and the City of Richmond. 
For the same period ending June 30, 1986, Central Fidelity Bank, 
N.A. (CFB), had 26 banking offices in essentially the same 
geographic localities with total deposits aggregating 
$702,561,000, or 11.3% of the commercial banking deposits in the 
Richmond RMA. Collectively, the two commercial banks accounted 
for approximately $2.l billiqn, or 33.7% of the commercial bank 
deposits and 30.6% of the total commercial bank branch offices. 
Although BOVA and CFB are the third and fourth largest 
financial institutions in the Richmond RMA, the significance of 
(30) Effective March 21, 1987, Bank of Virginia changed 
its name to Signet Bank/Virginia. 
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their market share is emphasized by the four-firm deposit 
concentration ratio. This concentration ratio accounts for the 
four largest commercial banking institutions in an RMA. This 
ratio has historically been used by the Department of Justice as 
a benchmark for reviewing acquisitions which may provide 
unreasonable market concentrations with respect to the four 
largest institutions. Consistent with the recognition of 
banking as a separate line of commerce, this ratio does not 
account for the deposits of thrift institutions. 
Name 
Bank of Virginia 
Central Fidelity Bank, N.A. 
Sovran Bank, N.A. 
United Virginia Bank 
Total 
Percent of Market 
22.37 
11.28 
22.79 
28.49 
84.93 
The remainder of the commercial banking market (15.07%) is 
widely dispersed through ten other banking entities. Based on 
the potential market dominance created by a merger of BOVA and 
CFB, it is very likely that the merger would have been contested 
by the Department of Justice and the primary banking 
regulators. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), calculated using only 
the deposits of commercial banks, supports the notion that the 
proposed merger would be subject to close scrutiny. As 
reflected in Appendix B, the HHI for commercial banks in the 
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Richmond RMA was 2,023.51. An HHI greater than 1,800 suggests a 
highly concentrated market and a merger would be challenged if 
the resulting consolidation also caused an increase in the HHI 
of 200 points or more. The proposed merger of BOVA and CFB 
raises the HHI to 2,529.75, excluding thrifts, and causes an 
increase in the HHI of 506.24 points. Based on Departent of 
Justice guidelines, it is highly unlikely that the merger would 
be consummated. 
The significance of the thrift market share in the Richmond 
RMA (see Appendix B) is reflected by the thrift institution's 
control of 30.4% of the aggregate deposits of commercial banks 
and thrifts. This dominant market share of deposits held by 
thrifts would have a highly dilutive effect on the HHI if used 
in the merger analysis. In the proposed merger of BOVA and CFB, 
the use of thrift deposits decreased the pre-merger HHI to 
1,083.88, which is reflective of an unconcentrated market. In 
the post-merger analysis, the HHI suggests the market is 
moderately concentrated as the index increases 246 points to 
1,330.36. 
HHI IliCIDDING HHI INCIDDING 
HHI EXCIDDING 100% OF 50% OF 
'IHRIFT DErosITS 'lERIFl' DErosITS 'IHRIFT DErosITS 
Pre-merger 2,023.51 1,083.88 1,658.70 
Post-merger 2,529.75 1,330.36 2,025.91 
Net Increase 506.24 246.48 340.21 
Under current Department of Justice guidelines, a potential 
merger is challengeable if: (1) the HHI is greater than 1,800 
29 
points, and (2) the increase in the HHI as a result of the 
merger is 200 points or more. 
In summary, the consideration of the market share held by 
thrifts in this proposed merger transaction is quite significant 
as the pre-merger HHI is diluted by 46% when 100% of thrifts 
deposits are considered. Although the post-merger HHI increases 
by 246 points, it is improbable the merger would be challenged 
because the HHI remains substantially below 1,800 which the 
Department of Justice considers indicative of a highly 
concentrated market. Moreover, the high concentration of thrift 
off ices in the dominant market areas of BOVA and CFB may 
possibly prevent any required divestitures to facilitate this 
merger transaction. 
conclusion 
As indicated above, the addition of thrift institutions as 
direct competitors with commercial banks can have a material 
effect on potential mergers and acquisitions. In both Case 1 
and Case 2, thrift representation significantly decreased the 
measured concentration in the Richmond, Virginia RMA. Moreover, 
the use of thrift deposits in calculating the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index suggested that there was little difference 
between weighting thrift deposits at either 50% or 100% in 
determining market concentration. 
In the Richmond RMA, the difference between using either 
50% or 100% of thrift deposits was generally immaterial, and may 
suggest that the various regulatory merger guidelines be 
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consolidated. The empirical evidence shows that merger results 
could be substantially different based on the inclusion of 
thrifts in market concentration analysis. The policy 
implication of considering thrift's deposits in the evaluation 
of proposed bank mergers is that it would be reasonable and 
efficient to reassess the consideration of commercial banking as 
a "separate line of commerce." 
Commercial banking as a "separate line of commerce" has 
been recognized by regulatory authorities since the supreme 
Court's 1963 decision on Philadelphia National Bank. However, 
with the passage of the Depository Institution Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act in 1980, and the subsequent passage of the 
Garn-st. Germain Act in 1982, thrift institutions have gradually 
gained expanded powers. These expanded powers have allowed 
thrift institutions to engage in transaction accounts and make 
commercial loans. With the capacity to engage in these 
activities, the connotation that commercial banking is a 
"separate line of commerce" in merger transactions has 
correspondingly eroded. 
This study has empirically demonstrated that thrifts should 
be included in any analysis of competition in the financial 
services industry. In Case 1, thrifts would have signicantly 
altered the market concentration of commercial banks, when 
either 50% or 100% of the thrift deposits were considered. 
Furthermore, the recognition of thrifts as competitors would 
have precluded the divestiture of branches to facilitate the 
merger. In Case 2, it was demonstrated that in markets where 
31 
banking is highly concentrated and trhifts are competitive in 
size and number, a concentration index combining banks and 
thrifts will be significantly lower, even if the merging banks 
have a dominant portion of the commercial banking market. This 
factor can have a material effect on potential mergers and 
acquisitions in highly concentrated market areas. 
The inclusion of thrifts in market concentration analysis, 
ultimately, will more closely approximate the conditions in a 
perfectly competitive market. It will also ensure that the 
benefits, convenience, and needs of a market are more 
efficiently met. As this study has shown, thrift competition is 
a reality in the Richmond RMA and, potentially as well as in 
other markets. Bank regulators have begun to recognize the 
competitiveness of thrift institutions and their usefulness to 
the economy. The benefits of including thrifts in analyses of 
competition in the banking industry shown by this study should 
encourage senior management of financial institutions to 
assertively request that 100% of thrifts deposits be included in 
future regulatory evaluations of bank mergers and acquisitions. 
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Appendix A 
DEPOSIT DATA 1980 DEPOSIT DATA 1986 DEPOSIT GROWTH 
I OF TOTAL PERCENT I OF TOTAL PERCENT DOLLAR PERCENT 
BRANCHES DEPOSITS OF DEPOSITS BRANCHES DEPOSITS OF DEPOSITS 6ROW1H GROWTH 
lcHESTERFIELD COUNTY 49 270,1S2 100.0l SB Bl9,B53 100.0l 549,701 203.51 
I BANKS 30 171,510 63.51 34 4n,B72 50.51 242,362 141. 31 SAVINGS fr LOANS 17 97,122 36.0l 21 393,297 48.0l 296,175 305.0l 
I 
CREDIT UNIONS 2 1,520 0.61 3 12,684 1.57. 11, 164 734.51 
GOOCHLAND COUNTY r 38,316 100.0X 5 62,451 100.0l 24, 135 63.0l J 
BANKS 5 38,316 100.0l 5 62,451 100.0l 24,13S 63.0l 
SAVINGS fr LOANS 0 0 o.ox 0 0 O.Ol 0 O.Ol 
CREDIT UNIONS 0 0 O.Ol 0 0 O.Ol 0 O.Ol 
HANOVER COUNTY 19 202,0B9 100.0X 21 450,0lS 100.0l 247,926 122.7X 
BANKS 11 139,959 69.31 13 287,819 64.0l 147,860 105.61 
SAVINGS fr LOANS 6 61,929 30.61 7 161,594 35.91 99,665 160.91 
CREDIT UN IONS 2 201 0.11 1 602 0.11 401 199.51 
HENRICO COUNTY 79 678,819 100.0X BS 1,678,021 100.07. 999,202 147.21 
BANKS 56 433,307 63.Bl SB 914,910 54.51 481 ,603 111.17. 
SAVINGS fr LOANS 23 245,512 36.21 26 763,075 45.51 517,S63 210.81 
CREDIT UNIONS 0 0 o.ox 1 36 O.Ol 36 0.07. 
CITY OF RICH"OND 174 3,330,559 100.0l 184 6,281,919 100.0l 2,951,360 88.61 
BANKS Bl 2,361,210 70.91 84 4,546,904 72.41 2,185,694 92.6% 
SAVINGS fr LOANS 32 853,843 25.6% 37 1,395,270 22.27. 541,427 63.41 
CREDIT UNIONS 61 115,506 3.51 63 339,745 5.41 224,239 194.17. 
TOTAL RICHMOND RMA 326 4,519,935 100.0l 353 9,292,259 100.0Z 4,772,324 105.61 
BANKS 183 3,144,302 69. 61 194 6,225,956 67.0l 3,0Bl,654 98.0l 
SAVINGS fr LOANS 78 1,258,406 27.81 91 2,713,236 29.27. 1,454,830 115.61 
CREDIT UNIONS 65 117,227 2.6l 68 353,067 3.8l 235,840 201.2% 
STATE OF VIRGINIA 2,482 28,0B0,318 100.0l 2,635 59,389,065 100.0l 31,307,747 111. 5l 
BANKS 1,617 19,184,000 68.31 1,760 37,267,462 62.87. 18,083,462 94.31 SAVINGS fr LOANS 457 7,444,377 26.51 503 15,664,723 26.4Z 8,220,346 110.41 CREDIT UNIONS 408 1,451,941 5.21 372 61455,880 10.91 5,003,939 344.67. 
TE: ALL DEPOSIT DATA IS IN THOUSAHDS. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE NO MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS IN VIRGINIA. 
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Appendix-B 
DATA FOR 19Bb 
TOTAL PERCENT OF CURRENT HHI EXCLUl>INS 
BANKS DEPOSITS MRKET SHARE HHI THRIFTS & CUs 
I BANK OF VIRGINIA l,392,852 J5.6t 243.36 501.76 
CENTRAL FIDELITY BANK, N.A. 702 15&1 7.91 &2.41 127.69 
THE co""ONNEALTH BANK 1,506 O.Ol 0.00 o.oo 
COKKERCE BANK OF HENRICO 4,334 0.01. o.oo 0.00 
I CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST co. 46,074 0.51 0.25 0.49 
DOKINION BANK OF RICHKOND, N.A. 331,195 3. 7l 7.40 28.09 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, LOUISVILLE 2,673 0.01 o.oo o.oo 
IF&KBANK 37,053 0.4't 0.16 0.36 
FIRST VIRGINIA BANK - COLONIAL 199 ,676 2.11 4.41 9.00 
JEFFERSON NATIONAL BANK 307,972 3.41 11.56 24.01 
I PEOPLES BANK OF VIRGINIA 9,040 0.11 0.01 0.01 
SOYRAN BANK, N.A. 1,418,758 15.91 252.81 519.84 
UNION BANK & TRUST CO. 8,685 O.Jl 0.01 0.01 
UNITED YIR6INIA BANK 1,773,577 19.BI 392.04 812.25 
TOTAL BANKS 6,225,956 69.67. 974.42 2023.51 
SAVINGS & LOANS 
BAY SAVINGS BANK, FSB 20,502 0.21 0.04 
I CARDINAL S&L ASSOC 141,551 1.61 2.56 
I CITIZENS S&L ASSOC. 215,626 2.U 5.76 
COLONIAL S&L ASSOC. 186,814 2.17. 4.41 
• DOKINION FEDERAL S&L ASSOC. 76,965 0.91 0.81 
I FIRST COLONIAL S&L ASSOC. 0 O.Ol o.oo 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK OF VA. 31,096 0.31 0.09 
FRANKLIN FEDERAL S&L ASSOC. 284,632 3.27. 10.24 
I HERITAGE S&L ASSOC. 550,177 6.27. 38.44 
I INVESTORS S&L ASSOC. 489,452 5.51 30.25 
LINCOLN S&l ASSOC. 156,400 1.71 2.89 
I PIONEER FEDERAL S&L ASSOC. 49,266 0.61 0.36 
SECURITY FEDERAL S&L ASSOC. 198,988 2.21 4.84 
1 UNION KUTUAL S&L ASSOC. 0 O.Ol o.oo 
YIRGINIA FEDERAL S&L ASSOC. 258,425 2.91 8.41 
YIRGINIA FIRST SAVINGS, FSB 53,342 0.61 0.36 
TOTAL SAYINGS & LOANS 2,713,236 30.41 109.46 
TOTAL BANKS AND 
SAYINGS AND LOANS B,939,192 100.0l 1083.88 
TOTAL CREDIT UNIONS 353,067 3.87. 
TOTAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 9,292,259 100.0l 1083.88 
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DATA FOR 1980 
TOTAL PERCENT OF CURRENT HHI EXCLUDING 
BANKS DEPOSITS llARKET SHARE HHI THRIFTS l CUs 
BANK OF VIRGINIA 506,831 11.51 132.25 259.21 
CENTRAL FIDELITY BANK, M.A. 355,212 B.1% 65.61 127.69 
THE COMMONWEALTH BANK 0 O.Ol 0.00 (),Q() 
COMMERCE BANK OF HENRICO 0 O.OI o.oo o.oo 
CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST ca. 31,046 o. 7l 0.49 1.00 
DOllINION BANK OF RICHllOND, N.A. 127, 921 2.9I 8.41 16.81 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, LOUISVILLE () O.OI o.oo o.oo 
F l II BANK 41,247 0.91 0.81 1.69 
FIRST VIRGINIA BANK - COLONIAL 120,331 2.71 7.29 14.44 
JEFFERSON NATIONAL BANK 239,098 5.41 29.16 57.76 
PEOPLES BANK OF VIRGINIA 0 O.OI o.oo o.oo 
SOVRAK BANK, M.A. 7bl,684 17.31 299.29 585.b4 
UNION BANK & TRUST CO. 0 O.OI o.oo o.oo 
UNITED VIRGINIA BANK 960,932 21.81 475.24 936.36 
TOTAL BANKS 3, 144,302 71.42 1018.55 2000.6 
SAVINGS & LOANS 
BAY SAYINGS BANK, FS8 () 0.01 o.oo 
CARDINAL S&L ASSOC 0 0.01 o.oo 
CITIZENS S&L ASSOC. 134,809 3.1% 9.61 
COLONIAL S&L ASSOC. 51,964 1.21 1.44 
DOllINION FEDERAL S&L ASSOC. 0 O.OI o.oo 
1 
FIRST COLONIAL S&L ASSOC. 567 O.OI o.oo 
FIRST FEDERAL SAYINGS BANK OF VA. 1,574 O.OI 0.00 
FRANKLIN FEDERAL SlL ASSOC. 253,819 5.81 33.64 
HERITAGE S&l ASSOC. 271f130 6.21 38.44 
INVESTORS S&L ASSOC. 47 ,739 1.11 1.21 
LINCOLN S&L ASSOC. 25,892 0.61 0.3b 
PIONEER FEDERAL S&L ASSOC. 20,864 0.51 0.25 
SECURITY FEDERAL S&L ASSOC, 179,276 4.1% 16.81 
UNION llUTUAL S&L ASSOC. 7,304 0.21 0.04 
VIRGINIA FEDERAL S&L ASSOC. 214,532 4.91 24.01 
VIRGINIA FIRST SAVINGS, FSB 48,936 1.U 1.21 
TOTAL SAVINGS & LOANS 1,258,406 28.61 127.02 
TOTAL BANKS AND 
SAVINGS AND LOANS 4,402,70B 100.0I 1145. 57 
TOTAL CREDIT UNIONS 117 ,227 2.61 
TOTAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 4,519,935 100.0I 1145. 57 
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Appendix D 
DATA FOR 1980 DATA FOR 1986 
I OF TOTAL llARKET I OF TOTAL llARKET 
LOCATION BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE 
CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 49 270,152 100.0l 58 819,853 100.0l 
IAY SAVIN6S BANK, FSB 0 0 O.Ol 2 5,140 0.6l 
ANK OF VIR6INIA 5 24,924 9.21 6 117,110 14.31 
:ARDINAL S&L ASSOC 0 0 0.01 1 33,925 4. ll 
tENTRAL FIDELITY BANK, N.A. 5 21,600 8.01 5 70,874 8.61 
HESTERFIELO EllPLOYEES FCU 1 1,447 0.51 1 4,535 0.61 
:ITIZENS SlcL ASSOC 1 0 O.OI 1 521 0.11 
:OLONIAL S&L ASSOC 1 25,301 9.41 1 77,524 9.51 
rHE COllllONNEALTH BANK 0 0 O.Ol 1 1,506 0.21 
lOllINION BANK OF RICHllOND,N.A. 13,560 5.01 2 41,831 5.11 
:rBERS FCU 0 0 0.(ll B,016 I.OX 
I rIRsT coLoNIAL s&L Assoc 567 0.21 0 0 0.01 
:1RST FEDERAL SAVIN6S BANK OF VA. 1 1,574 0.61 2 31,096 3.81 
:1RST VIR61NIA BANK - COLONIAL 3 11,693 4.31 4 25,382 3.11 
t le II BANK 4 22,206 0.21 1 1,045 0.11 I 
I iAllNER FCU 1 73 0.01 1 131 O.OI 
iERITAGE S&L ASSOC 2 11, 056 4.41 2 44,167 5.41 
· INVESTORS S&L ASSOC 2 2,917 1.11 3 64,977 7.91 
! JEFFERSON NATIONAL BANK 6 30,701 11.41 6 40,276 4.91 
"INCOLN SlcL ASSOC 2 12,260 4.51 2 41,095 5.11 
I PEOPLES BANK OF VIRGINIA 0 0 O.Ol 1 9,040 1.11 
~IONEER FEDERAL S&L ASSOC 3 20,864 7. 7% 3 49,266 6.01 
' SECURITY FEDERAL SlcL ASSOC 2 8,943 3.31 2 19,028 2.31 
SOVRAN BANK, N.A. 4 27,969 10.41 4 64,080 7.81 
UNITED VIRGINIA BANK 2 18,849 7.01 4 42,720 5.21 
I ~IR6INIA FEDERAL SlcL ASSOC 1 8,807 3.31 10,518 2.31 
~IRGINIA FIRST SAVINGS, FSB 1 3,873 1.41 7,24v 0.9% 
600CHLAND COUNTY 5 38,316 100.0l 5 62,451 100.01 
DOlllNION BANK OF RICHllOND, H.A. 
I JEFFERSON NATIONAL BANK 
2 6,784 17.71 
3 31,532 82.31 
2 11,247 10.0l 
3 51,204 82.0l 
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DATA FOR 1980 DATA FOR 1986 
t OF TOTAL "AR KET I OF TOTAL "AR KET LOCATION BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE 
HANOVER COUNTY 19 202,089 100.0I 21 450,015 100.0l 
NK OF VIRGINIA 0 0 O.Ol I 3, 134 O.JI TIZENS S&L ASSOC 1 9,228 4.6% 1 19,753 4.4% RST VIRGINIA BANK - COLONIAL 5 55,003 27.2I 5 70,972 IS.BX ANKLIN FEDERAL S&L ASSOC 17,550 8.7% 28,351 6.31 NOVER COUNTY E"PLOYEES CU 1 153 O.ll 1 602 O. !l RITA6E S&L ASSOC 1 17,238 S.5I 1 22,815 s.11 A FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 1 48 O.Ol () () 0. OX VESTORS S&L ASSOC 0 0 O.OI 1 39,900 B.9% NCOLN S&L ASSOC 1 3, 911 1.9% 1 23,361 5.2% 
:cuRITY FEDERAL S&L ASSOC 1 10,940 5.4I 1 16,451 3. 7l IVRAN BANK, N.A. 2 31,049 15.4% 2 104,854 23.3% llON BANK & TRUST CO 0 0 O.OI 1 8,685 1. 9% IITED VIRGINIA BANK 4 53,907 26.7% 4 100, 174 22.31 
' RSIHIA FIRST SAVINGS, FSB 3,0b2 1.51 10,963 2.41 
HENRICO COUNTY 79 67B,B19 100.0l 85 1,678,021 100.0l 
~V SAVINGS BANK, FSB 0 0 O.Ol 2 6,400 0.41 
~NK OF VIRGINIA 12 106,454 15. 7l 10 208,327 12.4% 
~RDINAL S&L ASSOC 0 0 O.Ol 1 86,871 5.21 
:NTRAL FIDELITY BANK, N.A. 11 59,816 B.Bl 11 239,299 14.3% ITIZENS S&L ASSOC 4 37' 547 5.51 5 71,295 4.2I DLONIAL S&L ASSOC 3 14, 150 2.1% 3 56,732 3.4% ~""ERCE BANK OF HENRICO 0 0 O.Ol 1 4,334 0.3% 
D"INION BANK OF RICH"OND, N.A. 6 43,908 b.51 5 90,018 5.4% IRST NAT BK, LOUISVILLE 0 0 O.Ol 1 2,673 0.21 
IRST VIRGINIA BANK - COLONIAL 4 13,386 2.01 6 28,262 1.7l RANKLIN FEDERAL S&L ASSOC 1 7,579 1. ll 1 16,537 1.01 ERITAGE S&L ASSOC 5 90,450 13.31 " 256,210 15.3% J TA FCU 0 0 O.Ol 1 36 O.Ol NVESTORS S&L ASSOC 4 33,047 4.91 3 118, 756 7.1% EFFERSON NATIONAL BANK 7 45,448 6.71 5 51,479 3.11 INCOLN S&L ASSOC I 629 0.11 I 30,584 1.8X 
& " BANK 2 9,925 1.51 3 2,271 0.11 ECURITY FEDERAL S&L ASSOC 2 34,495 5. lZ 2 63, 128 3.8% OVRAN BANK, N.A. 7 70,701 10.4% 7 135,283 8.1% NITED VIRGINIA BANK 7 83,669 12.3% 9 152,964 9. II IR6INIA FEDERAL S~L ASSOC 3 27,615 4.1% 3 56,556 3.41 
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I 
t. 
LOCATION 
I 
I CilY OF RICH"OND 
~•ssOCIATED GREYHOUND FCU ANK OF VIRGINIA AY SAVINGS BANK, FSB ~EACDN PRESS E"PLOYEES FCU ELLWOOD FCU INSY FCU 
:BLUE CROSS E"PLOYEES CU, INC 
fRISTEEL FCU 
m:• "· EKPLOYEES FCU 
CALL FCU 
I, ARDINAL Stl ASSOC ENTRAL FIDELITY BANK, N.A. l 0 E"PLOYEES CU, INC 
(Cl P TELEPHONE EPIPLOYEES FCU 
IHIPPENHAlf HOSP EllFLOYEES FCU ITI1ENS Stl ASSOC 
1COLONIAL SlL ASSOC 
~. DNSOLIDATED BANK t TRUST CO ORA GATED FCU . OUNTY OF HENRICO FCU j. IR CREDIT UNION 1 INC llIECON FCU 
' D"INION BANK OF RICHllDND, M.A. 
, DO"INION CU, INC 
IOKINION FEDERAL Stl ASSOC . UPONT FIBERS EMPLOYEES CU, INC 
!EXXON EPIPLOYEES FCU 
I l "BANK FV FCU , IFTH ST. BAPlIST CHURCH FCU 
FIRST BAPTIST FCU ~IRST VIRGINIA BANK - COLONIAL 
IJRENBOR!> FCU 
FRANKLIN FEDERAL Slt ASSOC 
~HERAL lfEDICAL CORP FCU 
~RITASE S~l ASSOC 
,I B E II LOCAL 669 FCU 
IVESTORS StL ASSOC FF DAVIS FCU FFERSON NATIONAL BANK 
LIFE OF VIRGINIA FCU ~NCDLN Stl ASSOC 
DATA FOR 1980 
I OF TOTAL MARKET 
BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE 
174 3,330,559 100.0Z 
1, 134 
15 375,453 
0 0 
1 59 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
11,451 
102 
744 
82 
101 
4,217 
0 
11 273, 788 
1 4,470 
1 3,815 
0 0 
4 
2 
3 
1 
88,034 
12,433 
31,046 
80 
1 51074 
1 1,445 
1 77 
s 63,669 
0 0 
0 0 
1 15, 115 
1 327 
1 9,116 
1 276 
1 32 
0 0 
1 
4 228,690 
1 250 
7 
1 
2 
0 
151,586 
1, 114 
11, 775 
0 
9 131,417 
1 1, 852 
1 9 ,092 
o.oz 
11. 31 
O.Ot 
0.01 
0.31 
0.01 
0.01 
O.Ol 
0.01 
0.11 
O.Ol 
8.21 
0.14 
0.12. 
O.OI 
2.61 
0.4Z 
0.91 
o.oz 
0.21 
o.ot 
O.Ol 
1. 91 
o.oz 
O.OI 
o.sz 
O.OI 
0.31 
0.01 
O.OI 
o.oz 
1.2% 
0.01 
6.9I 
o.oz 
4.61 
O.OI 
0.41 
O.OI 
3.91 
o.n 
0.31 
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DATA FOR 1986 
I OF TOTAL KARKET 
BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE 
184 6,281,919 100.0l 
11496 O.Ol 
13 1,064,281 16.91 
2 8,962 o.tz 
71 0.01 
1 lb,b53 0.31 
0 0 O. Ol 
1 2,216 0.01 
1 21 0.01 
1 207 0.01 
1 30,899 0.51 
1 20,755 0.31 
10 392,388 6.21 
1 81846 0.11 
14,914 0.21 
862 O.Ol 
4 124,057 2.01 
2 52,558 0.81 
3 46,074 0.71 
0 0 0.01 
1 14,077 0.21 
1 2,664 o.oz 
1 Bl 0.01 
8 188!099 3.0I 
1 10,352 0.21 
2 76,965 1.21 
1 44 1 100 0.11 
1 206 0.01 
2 33,737 0.51 
1 328 0.01 
1 56 O. Ol 
I 9 0.01 
7 65,060 1.0l 
1 7,386 O.lX 
4 239,744 3.81 
0 0 0.01 
5 226,979 3.bl 
1 11195 O.Ol 
4 265,819 4.2% 
1 100 0.01 
7 165,013 2.61 
1 4,394 O. ll 
2 60,560 1.0l 
DATA FOR 1980 DATA FDR 1986 
I OF TOTAL "ARK ET I OF TOTAL "ARKET LOCATION BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE 
CITY OF RICH"OND 
l!ACC FC:U 0 0 0.0I 1 1,885 o.oz 
"CGUIRE V A H FCU 1 4,362 o. n 1 13,771 0.2% 
"ILLER & RHOADES FC:U 1 1,268 O.OI 1 1,219 o.oz NABISCO E"PLOYEES FCU 1 206 O.OI 819 o.oz 0-8-1! FC:U 1 73 o.oz 1 125 o.oz RBR FCU 0 0 o.oz 1 25 o.oz R F ~ P RICHl!OND FCU 1 1,733 0.11 1 3,975 O. lI RECD El!PLOYEES CU, INC: I 298 o.oz 1 264 o.oz REYl!ET FCU 1 1,434 0.01 1 8,714 O. lI REYNOLDS FOIL FCU 1 1,400 o.oz 1 3,105 O.OI RICHFOOD E"PLOYEES FCU 1 270 O.OI 1 1,337 0.01 RICHl!OND CONTINENTAL FCU 1 124 O.OI 1 240 O.OI RICHl!OND FEDERAL El!PLOYEES FCU 1 2,520 0.11 1 8, 127 0.11 
RICH"OND FIRE DEPT CU, INC 787 o.oz 2,056 o.ox 
RICH"OND "E" HOSP E"PLOYEES CU, INC 1 712 0.01 1 1,434 o.oz 
RICHl!OND NEWSPAPERS E"PLOYEES FCU 1 770 o.oz 1 1,134 o.oz 
RICH"OND POLICE DEPT CU, INC 1 761 0.01 1 941 O.OI RICH"OND POSTAL CU, INC: 1 8,250 0.21 1 17,849 0.3% RIC~"OND TEACHERS FCU 1 1,906 0.11 1 3,240 0.1% RICH"OND TRANSIT FCU 1 662 O.OI 1 11 SOB 0.01 RICHl!OND VA l!UNICIPAL FLU 1 3,502 o.u 1 13, 127 0.21 RIVERVIEW BAPTIST FCU 0 0 o.oz 1 10 o.ox S. C. l. El!PLOYEES CU, INC 1 189 0.01 1 195 o.oz S. K. H. EKPLOYEES CU, INC 1 351 0.01 1 732 o.ox SAVE FCU 1 162 0.01 1 198 O.OI SEABOARD COAST LINE CU, INC 1 548 0.01 0 0 O.OI SECURITY FEDERAL S&L ASSOC 3 124,898 3.81 3 100,381 1. 61 SOUTHERN AID FCU 1 35 0.01 1 22 O.Ol SOUTHERN STATE EKPLOYEES' CU, INC 1 1,865 O.ll 1 3,310 o. n SOVRAN BANK, N.A. 18 631,965 19.01 18 1, 114, 541 17.77. SPRUANCE CELLOPHANE EKPLOYEE'S CU 1 3,116 0.11 1 4,421 o.n ST. PAUL'S BAPTIST FCU 14 0.01 1 22 0.01 STATE EKPLOYEES' CU, INC. 1 18,306 0.51 1 76,963 1. 21 THALHI"ER'S CU, INC. 1 1, 727 0.11 I 1,807 O.OI THRIFTY FCU 0 0 0.01 1 160 O.OI TYPO FCU 1 161 0.()Z 1 129 O.Ol U B C P RICHl!OND FCU 1 70 O.Ol 1 255 o.oz UNION l!UTUAL S&L ASSOC 1 7,304 0.21 0 0 0.01 UNITED VIRGINIA BANK 14 804,507 24.21 16 1,477, 711 23.51 UNIVERSITY CU l 94 0.01 1 194 0.01 VEPCO CU, INC 1 1, 726 o. u 0 0 O.OI VIRGINIA BOXER FCU 170 O.Ol 1 251 0.01 
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DATA FOR 1980 DATA FOR 1986 
I OF TOTAL ttARl\ET I OF TOTAL "AR KET 
LOCATION BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE BRANCHES DEPOSITS SHARE 
CITY OF RICHMOND 
VIR6INIA FEDERAL S&L ASSOC 5 178,030 5.31 5 183,351 2.91 
VIRSINIA FIRST SAVINGS, FSB 3 42,001 1. 31 3 35, 139 0.6I 
VIR6INIA FOOD DEALERS FCU 1 538 0.01 1 621 0.01 
VA UNITED "ETHODIST CONFERENCE FCU 1 1,969 0.11 1 3,645 0.1% 
VIRGINIA KUTUAL EKPLOYEES FCU 1 121 O.Ol 1 67 O.OI 
llARDS FCU 1 152 o.oz 0 0 o.oz 
WllLIAtt BYRD PRESS FCU 1 454 o.oz 1 707 O.Ol 
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Explanation of Resources 
The Richmond, Virginia Ranally Metro Area (RMA) is 
comprised geographically of the City of Richmond, and portions 
of Chesterfield County, Goochland County, Hanover County, and 
Henrico County (see Appendix c for geographic boundaries). The 
southeastern portion of Henrico County, which borders Charles 
City County, is not represented in the Richmond RMA. This area 
is primarily rural and has limited commercial activity. There 
are no financial institutions in this segment of Henrico County. 
In Chesterfield County, two areas of the county are not 
represented. The first area is the southern tip of Chesterfield 
County which includes the city of Colonial Heights and Ettrick, 
Virginia. This geogrpahic area is included in the Petersburg, 
Virginia RMA. The second area is the southwestern portion of 
Chesterfield County which has a sparse population base and has 
had little commercial or residential development. The eastern 
portion of Goochland County is the only area of the county 
represented in the Richmond RMA. This segment extends into the 
fast-growing western segment of Henrico County. In Hanover 
County, the only portion of the county that is not included in 
the RMA is the northwestern segment which borders Louisa County 
and Spotsylvania County. Although this area contains 
approximately $90 million in deposit branches, it is 
predominantly agricultural and sparsely populated. The rest of 
Hanover County is represented by the Richmond RMA and contains 
approximately 80% of the deposits in the County. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The following banking branches operated in those portions 
of Chesterfield, Goochland, and Hanover Counties not represented 
by the Richmond RMA. As of June 30, 1986, the total deposit 
base of these branches equaled $130,794,000, and accounted for 
only 1.4% of the total Richmond RMA deposits reflected in 
Appendix A. Due to the minor level of deposits in these 
branches, these balances were not subtracted from the total 
Richmond RMA deposits. For purposes of this paper, all 
references to the Richmond RMA include these branches and their 
respective deposit balances. 
Deposits 
Location COUnty (in $000} 
Central Fidelity Bank, N.A. Ettrick Clesterf ield $ 7,293 
Jefferson National Bank Goochlan:i Goochlan:i 32,729 
United Virginia Bank Beaverdam Hanover 13,995 
United Virginia Bank l))sWell Hanover 12,098 
5. Sovran Bank, N .A. Montpelier Hanover 64,679 
The Richmond RMA accounts for $9,292,259, or 15.6% of the 
total deposits in the State of Virginia for the period ended 
June 30, 1986. The Richmond RMA deposit structure indicates 
that commercial banks control 67% of the deposit base, compared 
to 29.2% for savings and loans, and 3.8% for credit unions. 
However, the average rate of growth for savings and loans of 
115.6% has outpaced the 98% average growth rate recorded for 
commercial banks during the six year period ended June 30, 1986. 
This high level of growth for the thrifts is predominantly 
centered in Chesterfield and Henrico Counties. 
Appendix A reflects deposit data, segregated by the city 
and county in the Richmond RMA, for both June 30, 1980 and June 
30, 1986. The deposit data was obtained from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The data indicates the 
composition of financial institutions within the various 
political boundaries of the Richmond RMA on an individual basis 
and on a consolidated basis. In addition, the deposit growth 
which is shown by both dollar amount and percentage, is for the 
period of June 30, 1980 to June 30, 1986. 
Appendix B of this report reflects the deposit 
concentration of each institution in the Richmond RMA. The 
column entitled "Percent of Market Share" represents the 
percentage of total deposits held by each commercial bank and 
thrift institution. The deposits held by the credit unions were 
shown to reflect their total market presence; however, these 
deposits were not used for the analysis of market 
concentration. The "Current HHI" represents the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index when accounting for 100% of the total deposits 
of both the commercial banks and thrift institutions. The final 
column entitled "HHI Excluding Thrifts & CUs" reflects the HHI 
without considering any type of competitor for the commercial 
banks. In its purest sense, this final column is reflective of 
commercial banking as a separate line of commerce. The data is 
shown for both the period ended June 30, 1980 and June 30, 
1986. 
Glossary of Bank Merger Terms 
Acquisition -
The process of taking control of stock or assets usually of 
a target corporation. 
Acquiring Corporation -
A corporation which acquires the stock or assets of a 
target corporation, generally in a merger. 
Assets -
Anything owned by a bank which has commercial or exchange 
value. Assets may consist of specific property or claims 
against others. 
Bank Holding Company -
Any company that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds the power to vote 25 percent or more of the voting 
shares of one or more banks or controls in any manner the 
election of a majority of the directors of a bank. 
Capital -
The amount subscribed and paid by stockholders to permit a 
bank to function as such. Capital requirements of banks 
are governed by size of the community in which they are 
chartered to operate. Capital must be fully paid in cash 
before a bank is allowed to open for business. 
Chain Banking -
An arrangement whereby the control of a number of banks is 
exercised through entire or majority ownership of stock by 
a group (not a corporate entity) who take an active role in 
formulating the policies of the banks. 
Concentrated Market -
A specific geographic area in which a few financial 
institutions aggregately hold such a large percentage of 
the banking resources that they are in a position to 
dominate the competitive environment in the market. 
Liabilities -
Funds a bank owes. The current indebtedness of a bank to 
those other than depositors is usually small in total, and 
represents obligations that are to be paid on a certain 
future date, such as notes, acceptances, and taxes. The 
capital structures are listed in bank statements as 
liabilities, but these accounts are the net worth of the 
bank, and represent the liability owing the stockholders of 
the bank. 
Merger Transaction -
A transaction in which one or more bank entities combine 
into another under the charter of one of the proponents. 
The resultant bank assumes all the liabilities of the banks 
involved. 
Parent Corporation -
A corporation which owns generally 100% of another 
corporation such as a subsidiary corporation. 
Phantom Bank Merger -
Any merger or other such transaction in the nature of a 
corporate reorganization which, in and of itself, would 
have no effect on competition. 
Purchase and Assumption Transaction -
A merger-type transaction in which one bank acquires the 
business of another bank (or banks) with the original 
bank's charter retained. 
Purchasing Corporation -
A corporation which purchases the stock or assets of a 
target corporation, generally in a taxable transaction. 
Target Corporation -
A corporation whose stock or assets will be acquired. 
Target Shareholders -
Shareholders of a target corporation who generally sell or 
exchange their stock in an acquisition. 
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